Literature Review 2025
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File:Literature Review - Jacob D. Bekenstein, “Information in the Holographic Universe” (2003) - KALOYAN REAU.pdf File:InhoJeon LiteratureReview.docx File:Literature review Disneyland as Imaginary.pdf File:LiteraryReviewSA.pdf [[File:Esra Gundem- Literature Review- Reflections on Exile, Edward W. Said.docx|thumb]] File:Literature-review-noorTabatabaie.pdf File:Siddharta's literature review "What is it like to be a bat" by Thomas Nagel.pdf File:Ipek Usman Literature Review Glitch.pdf File:Literature review POLAK WOJCIECH.pdf File:Literature review Abi van Dam Jonny Anomaly.pdf File:Literature reviewLiciaNaspro.pdf File:Emma Soave Verdi, L. The Symbolic Body and the Rhetoric of Power, PRA (Padua Research Archive), 2010 .pdf File:Literature review (Hasse).pdf File:Literature review Hester Sjoers Schopenhauer.pdf
Title of text you are reviewing
Template for your literature review. Include your name and don't forget to cite your sources!!
Jacob D. Bekenstein, “Information in the Holographic Universe” (2003), Submitted by Kaloyan Reau
Nagel, Thomas. “What Is It Like to Be a Bat?” The Philosophical Review 83, no. 4 (October 1974): 435–450 By Siddharta van der Sluis
Ethics for A-level. Capter 1, "Utilitarianism" section 1 to 4. Submmited by Floris van Leeuwen.
Said, Edward W. “Reflections on Exile.” In Reflections on Exile and Other Essays, 2nd ed., 173–86. Cambridge, Mass. : Harvard University Press, 2000. Submitted by Esra Gundem
Fromm, Erich. To have or to be? Continuum, 2008. 23-140 Submmited by Inho Jeon
Jung, C. G. Synchronicity: An Acausal Connecting Principle.
- Princeton University Press, 1973. 26–35 - Submitted by Patricia Saez
Introduction
In “Synchronicity”⁰, Carl Jung explores the concept of synchronicity, a “simultaneous occurrence of a certain psychic state with […] external events which appear as meaningful parallels to the momentary subjective state” (p.34), events that are meaningfully related but not causally connected. He argues that certain phenomena cannot be fully explained by notions of cause and effect. According to him, coincidences can reveal connections between the external world and unconscious psychic processes or “psychic conditions” (p.29). In this case, what many people call miracles could be seen as examples of synchronicity.
This raises the question: How can the illusion of miracles influence our perception of reality?
Miracles exist and influence our lives
Jung believed that the mind and the spirit affect our perception of physical material reality. He says that “space and time consist of nothing” (p.29), and that time does not exist in itself but is created through “psychic conditions”¹.
These psychic conditions are often unconscious. Jung believed our unconscious acts upon us² and viewed it as a source of meaning and symbolic guidance. The unconscious feelings often repressed by our conscious mind are, according to Jung, a tool to perceive the world we live in. We perceive meaningful coincidences when universal archetypal symbols³ are manifested, often when emotional intensity is created (surprise, fear, hope…). Thus, these apparently random events named “miracles” by many people and “synchronicities” by Jung appear when our unconscious mind is trying to make us learn something about ourselves.
This can be used by people to understand events they can’t explain. People also refer to religion to explain such events (i.e. Greek mythology⁴). This attempt at rational explanation is what Jung described with synchronicities: people seek meaning and symbolic understanding of events and the emotions they produce. Thus, the question is brought: do miracles truly exist, or only until science disproves them?
Are miracles truly possible?
Jung’s arguments are based on his experience, perception and assumptions, which might not be applicable to all. The existence of a collective unconscious can be questioned, since the interpretation of certain symbols depends on one’s cultural background and knowledge. This would make the unconscious specific and not universal and collective as he claimed. Being part of Western philosophy, Jung found Western meaning in symbols without considering indigenous or non European systems. For example, birds symbolize death in Western culture⁵, but “bringers of fertility”⁶ for the Zulu people. If symbols vary so much between cultures, Jung’s “universal archetypes” may be culturally conditioned interpretations.
Jung also argues that coincidences reveal underlying psychic structures, but this cannot be proven or disproven scientifically since it is subjective and based on perception.
When we attribute something to a miracle, we might obviate the invisible thing that truly caused said event. For instance, after a fire in a Spanish village, a woman claimed that the church wasn’t burnt to the ground thanks to the fact that she saved a statue of the Virgin Mary, but it was firefighters who did⁷.
This is how conspiracy theorists thrive: they try to explain the unknown as miracles or coincidences, but there is often a hidden cause. Whether we call them miracles or coincidences, these events reveal our human need to find meaning in the unknown. Jung’s theory of synchronicity gives a psychological explanation for this urge but doesn’t prove that miracles exist beyond subjective perception.
Conclusion
To conclude, the illusion of miracles influences our perception of reality, making us believe that events that appear as random are miracles or have an underlying psychic meaning our unconscious tries to reveal. However, it might just explain the unexplainable and unknown to humans today, becoming a way to obviate other reasons why things happen.
Footnotes:
⁰Jung, C. G. Synchronicity: An Acausal Connecting Principle. Princeton University Press, 1973. 28-35
¹(emotions, dreams, feelings…)
²just as Sigmund Freud, but Freud viewed it as repressed instinct that can be analyzed to learn more about ourselves
³Archetypal symbols are what Jung described as universal symbols that are present in our collective unconscious, making themselves visible during synchronicities or meaningful coincidences.
⁴In Greek mythology, Zeus’ anger was used to explain thunder, which was later disproved by science. List of thunder deities - Wikipedia
⁵Even in the West, the symbol varies: freedom, love, transformation…
⁷Article on Religión Digital, written by RD/Agencias | 20.08.2025
Russel, Legacy. 2020. Glitch Feminism: A Manifesto. Verso. Submitted by Ipek Usman
Mark Fisher, 2009. "It’s easier to imagine the end of the world than the end of capitalism", submitted by Wojciech Polak
Nietzsche’s Critique of Utilitarianism by Jonny Anomaly chapter 3. Egoistic Altruism submitted by Abi van Dam
Ricard, Matthieu. 2014. “A Buddhist View of Happiness.” Journal of Law and Religion 29, no. 1 (February): 0-16 by Daria Mashkantseva
"Manifesto of Futurist Painters" (U. Boccioni and others) from "100 artists' Manifestos; from the Futurist to the Stuckiest"- Alex Danchev. Submitted by Licia Naspro
Traiger, Saul. “‘SHADOW PLAY’: Original Air Date: May 5, 1961.” In Twilight Zone Reflections: An Introduction to the Philosophical Imagination, 139–41. Lever Press, 2024. by Hasse Visser.
Jacques Ellul, Propaganda: The Formation of Men’s Attitudes, Chapter 3 - The necessity for Propaganda (p.118-160), trans. Konrad Kellen and Jean Lerner (New York: Vintage Books, 1973), submitted by Sokratis Anastasiou
Judith Butler, “Critically Queer” (GLQ, 1993)Noor tabatabaie
File:Thien Verschoor Literature Review.pdf
Simondon, Gilbert, Cécile Malaspina, and John Rogove. “On the Mode of Existence of Technical Objects.” Minneapolis, Univocal (2017). Submitted by Thien Verschoor
Schopenhauer, Arthur. The World as Will and Representation. Translated by E. F. J. Payne. New York: Dover Publications, 1969. Submitted by Hester Sjoers.
Disneyland as Imaginary
Tom Gawlinski
In Baudrillard’s thesis Simulacra and Simulation, specifically in The Precession of Simulacra, Baudrillard focuses on Disneyland in the Hyperreal and Imaginary chapter. He explains the role of Disneyland in the scope of simulacra, labelling it to the third order of simulation, which is, shortly said, the masking of the absence of reality. His main argument is that Disneyland is there as an imaginary reality in order to present everything outside of Disneyland as real, when in fact America (or everything else) is already in the hyperreal, which is an imaginary reality. It conceals the fact that reality is not there anymore. He presents Disneyland as a miniaturised America in which all its values are summarized, put on display, inflated and intensified, to then be celebrated by the visiting crowds. Because of this small, contained oversaturation of culture, he argues that you can take individuals and crowds into account within his presentation of Disneyland, which he then uses to be able to perceive of Disneyland as an ‘objective’ reflection of America and as an ideology.
He reinforces his argument by referring to Disneyland as a ‘deterrence machine set up in order to rejuvenate in reverse the fiction of the real.’(Baudrillard 1983, 25). In other words, it is there to reassure people of the idea that fantasy is Disneyland, so that the idea that everything else is also fantasy is unlikely to occur. The childlike nature of Disneyland is there to make us believe that this is a place meant for children and that ‘real’ life, where the adults are, exists outside of Disneyland. This masks childishness everywhere, especially adults that go to Disneyland to act the role of the child, out of belief that they can let go of reality here, when it is as real as everywhere. He concludes by saying Disneyland is just one of these imaginary stations, which surround big cities like Los Angeles, and that they are here to feed ‘’reality energy’’ (Baudrillard 1983, 26) to these cities, places that he defines as large networks with large proportions of circulation, that are all unreal and in which space and dimensions do not play a role.
I want to give Baudrillard credit, who wrote this in 1981, for how relevant and applicable this text is to refer to other institutions, networks, and realities in contemporary culture. Especially the clarity of writing and in connecting Disneyland to American culture alongside the performativity of childhood versus adulthood make this one of the most interesting chapters of his thesis. Connecting Baudrillard’s ideas of ‘deterrence machines’, intensified displays of cultures and imaginary realities that hide absences of the fact that there is no reality can be easily linked to digital phenomena, platforms and networks like memes, that inflate, display and celebrate (online) culture. Or Instagram, which is also a deterrence machine and a fictional reality, not one that even tries to mask the absence of reality, but fully only refers to other signs and realities, a system that only rejuvenates and pumps out copies of signs and fictions that already have their own copies of copies. Or the infatuation with aesthetics which dominate platforms like Pinterest and shape modern culutre where in aesthetics are nothing more than collections of copies, networks of simulacrum. An aesthetic is a reality constituted only of images that fit together purely based on colour, feeling or appearance and create fictional realities that, by calling them aesthetics, does not create awareness of creating a reality as such (which is more the case with Disneyland) putting both (online) contemporary aesthetics and Instagram in the fourth stage of simulacrum.
My only criticism of the text would be how little emphasis Baudrillard puts on calling Disneyland an ideology (and how this can be crucial for understanding the text), and how he comes to this conclusion with almost no arguments, except for arguing that when American values are ‘exalted here in miniature and comic strip form. Embalmed and pacified.’ (Baudrillard 1983, 25). I think having your only reasoning to perceive Disneyland as an ideology is because American values are amplified and displayed in Disneyland is not sufficient to come to this conclusion. An ideology already exists in America; the intensification of it does not incorporate new ideas. Though I do believe Disneyland can be perceived as an ideology through Baudrillard’s theory, in a way he did not explain. Disneyland is not only there to mask the absence of reality, but also to constitute beliefs. It simulates ideas that Disneyland is the only fictional reality, that it is the only place where childishness is accepted in adults because it is only fantasy, and just because Disneyland is perceived as only a fantasy and a form of entertainment its place in our society becomes domesticated and normalized which supports the contrast between real and fiction. Thus, it becomes a set of beliefs that establishes itself in a more primary ideology.
Bibliography: Baudrillard, Jean. “Hyperreal and Imaginary.” Essay. In Simulations, 23–26. Semiotext(e), Foreign Agents, 1983.
From here to eternity written by Meryt Nefertari
The book ‘from here to eternity’ was written by Caitlin Doughty and published in 2017. In the introduction of the book Caitlin has a conversation with a man from Belize, Luciano, who said that he and his friends talk about death all the time. They ask each other about what they want when they die. This made her realise that in her (American) culture, people are often squeamish about death and do not discuss it.
The book is about the corporatisation and commercialisation of death traditions. In the chapters she writes about the rituals concerning death that are (possibly) different from our own rituals. With this perspective she hopes the raise more awareness and to let you create your own opinions about death traditions. She also wants to show that there’s no one size fits all when it comes to how we handle death.
This book intrigued me because death is something that, like most people, scares me. I wanted to know more about why we have our traditions and what other traditions are. After reading the other perspectives I realised there are many cultures that do not fear death as much as I do. She wrote ‘’the ritual involves pulling someone I loved, and thus my grief, out into the light of day.’’ (236), which I found a very comforting conclusion. On the other hand, many of the traditions she discussed are not available or legal in my country (also not in all states) which makes this possibility again more distant.
Caitlin wrote ‘’Trust me, I didn’t drag myself around the world without some serious help.’’ (237), following all the people who helped her create a factually accurate story with proper research behind it. More importantly, she went to the countries herself and asked the locals directly about their traditions and how they feel towards them. Ethically I find it important that the stories come directly from the source to avoid assumptions about cultures we are not familiar with.
In the epilogue Caitlin states ‘’With my secular bias, … This judgement was wrong.’’ (232), admitting that she looks at this subject through her own lens but also showing that she has adjusted her predictions after collecting more experience and information.
My critique on this book is mainly based on Caitlin wanting to break the norm, by critiquing the current death traditions in American culture. Saying current rituals create shame and don’t leave space for mourning. By this she brushes over the people who do want a ‘regular’ funeral and who feel satisfied with their way of handling grief. Speaking of death avoidance as a cultural failing in which she proclaims that current culture does not leave space for proper mourning. If our current form of grieving is not working then why has it not changed in the past century? And how did death get commercialised? These are the questions I was left with after reading and which I would like to learn more about.
References
Doughty, Caitlin. From Here to Eternity: Travelling the World to Find the Good Death. Norton & Company, 2017.
Literature review: The extend of the will: sexuality and asexuality in Schopenhauer’s philosophy.
In section 60 of the world as will and representation, book 2, Schopenhauer aims to bring a clearness to the affirmation and denial of the will. §60 also focusses on, the sexual impulse as the clearest expression of the will to live. This will be the main focus of this literature review. This passage in Schopenhauer was chosen because the way he talks about sexuality frames it as something bigger than desire, he talks about it being a fundamental part of the force of life itself.
Schopenhauer believes the will to be something greater than an individual it is not bound to anything; it’s the ultimate source of all. When people are aware of the will, the will either affirms itself by willing, living and desiring, or it denies itself by avoiding indulgence and turning itself away from willing. The body its actions, its instincts and its desires are the expression of the will, the body is how the will presents itself in people, hence why Schopenhauer says that “Therefore instead of affirmation of the will, we can also say affirmation of the body.”.1
Schopenhauer states in his text that the satisfaction of the sexual impulse is bigger than the affirmation of the existence of an individual. As it affirms life for a period of time after the passing of an individual. With this he is saying that the saying that the sexual impulse is not about an individual’s personal desire and/or satisfaction, it is about procreation, about securing our species.
“Because the inner being of nature, the will-to-live, expresses itself most strongly in the sexual impulse”2, Schopenhauer says that nature is only concerned with the preservation of species, not the individual. But to what extent would this apply to individuals who experience asexuality. Schopenhauer puts a big emphasis on how the will-to-live most strongly expresses itself through the sexual impulse. But in the asexual experience there is no sexual impulse no sexual desire, even when there is a will to reproduce, in Schopenhauer’s view this would mean there should be a sexual impulse. Though Schopenhauer does state that through knowledge and intellect the impulses from the will can be resisted, this would require knowledge of the will and asexuality doesn’t present itself in a person as a choice, as a conscious decision to defy the will, it is a natural occurrence in an individual.
So, if according to Schopenhauer sexuality is the strongest expression of the will-to-live, would asexuality than be people denying the will. And is this denial from a point of knowledge and intellect or from nature, from a greater force that is beyond our power that drives us further. It could also be suggested that sexuality and asexuality are both expressions of the will, but in different forms and intensities.
Schopenhauer’s broader idea is that freedom and peace come from denying the will. If sexual desire/impulse exposes what is the wills strongest and most expressed hold on people’s lives, the existence of asexuality makes it possible that the force of the will can at least in part be denied by someone’s nature. Together sexuality and asexuality show that the dominance of the will on people is not an absolute power, and that exceptions exist, and that there is a potential for freedom from the will.
1 Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation, Book IV, §60, 327.
2 Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation, Book IV, §60, 330.
Bibliography
Schopenhauer, Arthur. The World as Will and Representation. Translated by E. F. J. Payne. New York: Dover Publications, 1969.
Having Mode and Being Mode : Which way I will follow for my relationship written by Inho Jeon
Recently, I wondered whether I had attempted to obtain my partner through the institution of marriage. So I read Erich Fromm’s To Have or To Be. In his writings, Fromm argues that we must move from living a life that is focused on having to one concentrating on being.1 He says the more we have, the lonelier we become.2 It cuts us off from the world. By contrast, a life of being is the growth of love and solidarity, and a life that is more connected to the world.3 Fromm stresses that in our modern society, we should choose a life of being.3 He states that moving from a life of having and consuming to a life of being is an important condition for happiness.1
But I criticize his view. In my opinion, the life of having and the life of being are not strictly opposed. They are modes of living that constantly shift in complex ways. In my own experience, I have witnessed how the desire to have can lead toward being. For example, I have a partner I want to marry. Through marriage, I want to own and consume my partner. I also realized that I am defining him and myself through certain traits. He is disabled, and I am not. At some point, when I introduced him to others, I found myself often adding, “He is disabled.” As I repeated this, I wondered why I felt I had to say it this way. I came to suspect that, as a non-disabled person, I was trying to use my relationship to show my moral goodness. By doing so, I turned my “goodness” into part of my self-image. This is clearly the life of having.4 By owning him, I fixed my identity and my existence. In this way, I began to date my partner in the mode of having. It was a way of lifting myself up.
As our relationship deepened, I desired to own him even more. I tried to own his body too, to claim even the most private parts of him through sex. Yet, the more I wanted more stimulating sex and sought possession, the more I showed my hidden, most vulnerable sides. Through that revealed vulnerability, trust began to build between us, and I came to accept him as a being. Hence, what started as a mode of having slowly changed into a mode of being. Through his being, I could share love and solidarity with more kinds of beings in daily life. I began to love him not as something to possess, but as someone to be/exist with. Driven by a stronger desire to have, I therefore moved to the mode of being.
According to Fromm’s logic, my desire to have should make me more broken and lonely. But based on my personal experience, it did not. The acts for stronger stimulation opened a path toward being. And in that way, I also came to long for the institution of marriage, not only to possess him but as a way to deepen our relationship. We do not need to pursue only a life of being for a happy life. The life of having is not always far from happiness, and the life of being is not always close to it. Through moving between these two modes of life, we can move not toward a selfish life but toward a life of love and solidarity with each other, a happy life.
1 Fromm, To have or to be? Continuum, 2008. 140
2 Fromm, To have or to be? Continuum, 2008. 89
3 Fromm, To have or to be? Continuum, 2008. 86
4 Fromm, To have or to be? Continuum, 2008. 23
Reference
Fromm, Erich. To have or to be? Continuum, 2008. 23-140
Literature review about dreams written by Hasse Visser
The book chapter discusses the dream argument problem in the episode "Shadow Play" from The Twiglight Zone. The text includes a passage from René Descartes's book "Meditations on First Philosophy" (1641). In that passage, he discusses: When you sleep, you often dream about things that are quite normal to you and that you often do in waking life. For example, Descartes was convinced that he was sitting by the fire with his clothes on, while he lay undressed in his bed. While asleep, not everything is always as clear and distinct as when you are awake. But even while asleep, he was deceived by similar illusions. There are no definite clues that allow us to clearly distinguish waking from sleep. After Descartes's passage, the text discusses the episode "Shadow Play," in which Adem Grant dreams about being accused of murder and sentenced to death. He tries to convince the others in his dream that it's just a dream and that they are just characters in his dream. The people in the dream don't believe Adem. Adem behaves very much as he would in waking life. But many dreams are just like our waking lives. It could be a dream that doesn't involve any unusual experiences. Even though Adem knows it's a dream, he doesn't fly or anything to make people believe it's a dream. The author says that's because many of our dreams are just like waking experiences. Why would Adem know that he's dreaming but doesn’t do anything with it? In my experience, you don't realize you're dreaming. You only notice this when you're awake and can't make a clear story out of it. Some people do realize they're dreaming. In that case, you have lucid dreams. In some cases, the dreamer can influence the dreams. It's possible that Adem does have lucid dreams but can’t influence it and therefore only does things he knows. But that doesn't mean dreams are looking so normal. Are dreams always like waking life? Usually, something unusual occurs in my dreams. People you've never met or haven't seen in a long time are there or unusual behavior from others or yourself. Is that changing te view of other or yourself? Sometimes, because so much happens in your dreams, you can't always make a story out of them or distinguish things from memories. So the dreams can have infulence on how you see yourself or others. Beacause the interaction felt like a memory and not a dream. Sometimes, it can get so close to reality with the people you know and situations that could or still have to happen that you store that as a memory. And find out later it was not real and didn’t happen. So, in conclusion: dreams are very similar to waking life and therefore not always distinguishable from waking life. I think that's often not the case. Dreams can use pieces of your waking life, which can cause confusion about what really happened and what didn't. But many of my dreams are so vague and strange that when I wake up, I immediately realize it was a dream. But then it can still change my view of myself, as if I were a completely different person in my dream, and not a good person.
Traiger, Saul. “‘SHADOW PLAY’: Original Air Date: May 5, 1961.” In Twilight Zone Reflections: An Introduction to the Philosophical Imagination, 139–41. Lever Press, 2024. http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.3998/mpub.14374928.67.